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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SHARI LYNN CRISMAN, MARK
CRISMAN,1 and PAUL HOWARD
PETERS,

Case No. 990698-CA

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
Priority No. 15

TED HALLOWS,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken from a final order of the Third
Judicial District Court granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant, Ted Hallows, on claims relating to the shooting of
plaintiffs' dogs.

Jurisdiction lies within this Court pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) under the order of
transfer from the Supreme Court of Utah dated October 22, 1999.

ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Plaintiff Peters' failure to file a statutory notice of

claim precludes his suit.
Standard of Review:
governed by statute.

The filing of a notice of claim is

"The proper interpretation of a statute is

*In the notice of claim filed on the Crisman plaintiffs1
behalf, Mark Crisman is identified as "a 2 year old boy" (R. 22).
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 17(b), "A minor pr an insane or incompetent
person who is a party must appear either by a general guardian or
by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the
court in which the action is pending." No such arrangements have
been made in this case.

/

a question of law.

Therefore, when reviewing an order of

dismissal involving the interpretation of a statute, [the
reviewing court] accord[s] no deference to the legal conclusions
of the district court but review[s] them for correctness."
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999).
2.

The Crisman plaintiffs1 failure to file suit within one year

of the denial of their notice of claim bars their suit as
untimely.
Standard of Review:

The statute of limitations governing

actions following the denial of a notice of claim is likewise a
question of statutory interpretation that is reviewed for
correctness.

Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court is contained
in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
Below
The complaint in this action (R. 11-1) 2 was filed on

December 24, 1997, by Shari and Mark Crisman and Howard Peters,
the respective owners of Trooper and Kiva, dogs which were shot
2

The record has been consecutively numbered from back to
front, meaning each document begins at a higher page number than
it ends.
2

by Mr. Hallows, a state wildlife officer, after they were
observed chasing deer.

The Crismans had previously filed a

r

"Written Notice of Claim for Injury Pursuant to Utah Code Section
63-30-11" (R. 22-21; quotation from R. 22) based only on the
death of Trooper.

The claim was denied on December 13, 1996

(R. 17), more than one year prior to the filing of the complaint
in this action.

At no time did plaintiff Peters file a notice of

claim on his own behalf for injuries to Kiva.
After suit was filed on December 24, 1997, Mr. Hallows moved
to dismiss (R. 16-15) on grounds of untimeliness and failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The motion was

supported by a memorandum (R. 40-17) attaching Mr. Hallows1
affidavit (R. 29-25) as well as the Crismans1 notice of claim
(R. 22-21) and the letter denying it (R. 17).

In his reply

(R. 70-61) to plaintiffs1 responsive memorandum (R. 57-55), Mr.
Hallows invited the court to treat the motion as one for summary
judgment based on his submission of materials outside the
pleadings (R. 69). He also moved the court to stay discovery
pending a determination on the motion to dismiss (R. 43-41).
After a hearing, the court entered an order on February 26, 1998,
dismissing plaintiffs' civil rights cause of action3 but
otherwise denying the motions to dismiss and to stay discovery,
ruling that the motion to dismiss turned on the factual question
of whether Mr. Hallows' actions were taken within the scope of
his employment (R. 90-89) . After the hearing was scheduled but
3

That ruling has not been challenged on appeal.
3

before it took place, Boyd Kimball Dyer entered his appearance as
substituted counsel for the Crismans; plaintiff Peters continued
to represent only himself (R. 87-86) .
Following denial of his motion to dismiss, Mr. Hallows filed
his answer (R. 100-92).

In October, 1998, he moved for summary

judgment (R. 109-08), arguing in the supporting memorandum
(R. 175-10) a lack of jurisdiction based on both the untimeliness
of the Crismans1 complaint (R. 165-64) and Peters' failure to
file a notice of claim on his own behalf (R. 164).

Plaintiffs

did not refute--nor could they--the jurisdictional facts on which
the motion was based.

A hearing was held May 17, 1999 (R. 348),

and the court entered an order granting dismissal on June 21,
1999 (R. 355-52).

Separate, timely notices of appeal were filed

on July 16, 1999, by the Crismans (R. 358) and plaintiff Peters
(R. 357).
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
The Crisman plaintiffs, mother and minor son (R. 22 and

143), were the owners of Trooper, a beagle mix dog (R. 142) that
was sent to stay with Mrs. Crismanfs brother, plaintiff Peters
(R. 143), in February, 1996 (R. 141). Peters is the owner of
Kiva, a yellow Labrador retriever (R. 137).
Defendant, Ted Hallows, a 13-year employee of the Utah
Division of Wildlife Services (DWR), is the superintendent of a
fish hatchery operated by DWR in Kamas, Utah (R. 158). On the
morning of April 24, 1996, he was working outdoors at the
hatchery when he heard the telephone ring over the loudspeaker
4

(R. 152). The caller, Gary Rice, left a message on the answering
machine that Mr. Hallows retrieved some 15 minutes later
(R. 151). The message reported that Mr. Rice had observed dogs
chasing deer on a hillside above the hatchery (R. 151). Mr.
Hallows then scanned the hillside with binoculars and saw deer
being pursued by two white dogs (R. 151).
DWR has a statutory duty to "protect, propagate, manage,
conserve, and distribute protected wildlife throughout the state"
(Utah Code Ann. § 23-14-1(2) (a) (1998) .

Because the dogs were

endangering the deer and nearby elk, which were in weakened and
stressed condition from the harsh winter and their flight through
deep snow drifts (R. 300), Mr. Hallows retrieved his rifle from
his nearby home (R. 309, % 12; R. 301, % 42) and watched the dogs
as they continued their pursuit (R. 3 08, % 15). After Mr.
Hallows temporarily lost sight of them, the dogs reappeared, and
he shot them, wounding Kiva and killing Trooper (R. 3 08-07,
UK 16-19).

At all relevant times, Mr. Hallows was on duty and in

full DWR uniform (R. 303, UK 32-33).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In any action against a government employee taken during
performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or
under color of law, a written notice of claim must be filed
within one year after the claim arises.
repeatedly been held jurisdictional.

This requirement has

It is clear that plaintiff

Peters was aware of this requirement, as he filed a notice of
5

claim on the Crismans1 behalf on September 14, 1996, well within
the statutory time limit.

However, it is equally clear that he

failed to file any notice of claim on his own behalf for injuries
to his dog, Kiva.

His default of the notice requirement dooms

his case.
While the Crismans filed a timely notice of claim on
September 14, 1996, it cannot save their case.

They failed to

file their complaint within the one-year statute of limitations <
measured from the date of the claim's denial.

Consequently, the

district court was without jurisdiction to consider it.
Even if plaintiffs were able to hurdle these jurisdictional
obstacles, their case would be defeated on its merits.

The

complaint itself speaks of Mr. Hallows' claim to have acted under
state code and agency mission statement provisions, bringing the
case within the scope of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and
its substantive as well as procedural provisions.

At no point

does plaintiff Peters counter Mr. Hallows' statements that he was
on duty and in uniform at all relevant times.

Plaintiffs' claims

simply lack the factual support necessary to sustain them.
Because plaintiffs have shown no error by the district
court, its decision is entitled to affirmance.

ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF PETERS' CLAIM IS BARRED BY HIS FAILURE TO FILE A
NOTICE OF CLAIM.
The district court rendered its favorable decision on Mr.

6

i

Hallows' motion for summary judgment on strictly legal grounds:
that plaintiffs1 claims were jurisdictionally barred by their
failure to fulfill the procedural requisites of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

As to plaintiff Peters1 claim, the

court held:
Utah Code Section 63-30-12 requires claims against the
State, based upon acts or omissions of employees while
acting within the course a[n]d scope of their
employment, are barred unless a notice of claim is
filed within one year of the alleged act or omission.
Peters failed to file a claim within one year of April
24, 1996 and is therefore barred from bringing the
present action.
R. 350.

Instead of addressing his default of the notice

requirement, Peters attempts to bypass it by arguing that a "jury
could rationally find [Mr. Hallows] was not acting in the course
of his employment as a fish hatchery supervisor working for the
Division of Wildlife Resources" (Brief of Aplts. at 12), thereby
surrendering both the procedural and substantive protections of
immunity act.

In his statement of the case, Peters cites Judge

Nehring's denial of Mr. Hallows' motion to dismiss on grounds
that "'it is unclear from the pleadings whether defendant was
performing his duties as a state employee at the time he shot the
dogs.

Accordingly, Nielsen [sic] v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah

App. 1994), is not controlling'" (Brief of Aplts. at 4, 1 5 ) .
Contrary to appellants' portrayal and Judge Nehring's
conclusion, the issue is squarely on point with this Court's
decision in Nielson.

The Nielson plaintiff attempted to avoid

the immunity act's notice requirement by representing his action
as "routine litigation between 'ordinary guys.'"
7

Nielson v.

Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah App. 1994).

Disagreeing, the

Court explained that Nielsen's argument
confuses the scope of the notice requirement with the
extent of substantive sovereign immunity protection.
Complying with the notice provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act is a
jurisdictional
requirement and a precondition to suit, and is in no
way co-extensive with the substantive provisions
contained within the Governmental Immunity Act which
insulate the sovereign and its operatives from
liability.
Id. at 135.

The Court further noted that

Nielson was aware, even from the initial stages of this
litigation, that Gurley claimed to have seized his
property under color of the State's authority. Given
this knowledge, Nielson will not now be heard to
complain that the Governmental Immunity Act does not
apply because Nielson only meant to sue Gurley as an
ordinary individual, not for anything he did in the
course of his employment by the State.
Id. at 134 (footnote omitted).
The facts in the case at bar compel an equivalent
conclusion.

Both Peters' and the Crismans' claims are similar,

alleging that Mr. Hallows unlawfully shot their respective dogs
for chasing deer together in a single course of action.

In his

capacity as the Crismans' legal representative, Peters filed a
timely notice of claim (R. 22-21) pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-11 and -12 (1997), while simultaneously neglecting to
file one on his own behalf.

His complaint explicitly avers that

"Ted Hallows claims to have shot Trooper and Kiva under color of
law as required by 'State Code' acting in his capacity as a fish
hatchery employee for the State of Utah.

Ted Hallows claims his

act was required by and consistent with the 'State's Mission

8

Statement1 on conservation" (R. 10, U 10). These facts make
clear that, like Nielson, Peters knew from the outset of this
litigation that the defendant claims to have acted in performance
of his duties, within the scope of his employment, and under
color of law.

Like Nielson, he cannot now be heard to deny the

immunity act's applicability by arguing that he is suing only on
the basis of private action.
Judge Nehring's denial of Mr. Hallows' motion to dismiss
(R. 90-89) does nothing to change the outcome.

The case was

filed in the Third District Court in and for the State of Utah,
Summit County, to which judges are routinely assigned on a
rotating basis.

As the case progressed, Judge Nehring, to whom

the case was originally assigned, was replaced by Judge Brian.
Under this Court's decision in Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies,
884 P.2d 1306, 1311 n.l (Utah App. 1994)," [a] single judge is
entitled to correct any interim order previously made, and even
though a location within a judicial district is on a rotating
judge calendar, the authority of the judge who actually decides
the case on the merits to correct a previously entered order is
undiminished."

See also Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 439-40

(Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring) ("In a sense, the two judges,
while different persons, constitute a single judicial office for
law of the case purposes, namely, the third district judge
serving Summit County").
In short, the issue of whether or not Mr. Hallows was
ultimately within the scope of the immunity act's substantive
9

protection does not alter plaintiffs1 duty to comply with the
act's procedural requisites.

Plaintiff Peters knew that a notice

of claim was required, as demonstrated by his filing of a notice
on the Crismans' behalf and by his reference in the complaint to
Mr. Hallows' claim of statutory and agency authority.

Peters'

default of notice is not excused by recasting his action as a
private one.

Consequently, the court's dismissal of Peters'

claim was correct and is entitled to this Court's affirmance.
II.

THE CRISMANS' CLAIM WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY.
Unlike plaintiff Peters, the Crismans filed a timely notice

of claim for the death of their dog, Trooper (R. 22-21).

The

claim was denied on December 13, 1996 (R. 17). Under the
governmental immunity act, the Crismans had one year following
the denial in order to file suit:

"The claimant shall begin the

action within one year after denial of the claim or within one
year after the denial period specified in this chapter has
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to
the claim is characterized as governmental."
§ 63-30-15(2) (1997).

Utah Code Ann.

The complaint in this case was filed on

December 24, 1997, 11 days beyond the one-year statute of
limitations.

Even plaintiffs admit this fact:

denied on December 13, 1996.

"The claim was

This was more than a year before

the date the action was filed, December 24, 1997" (Brief of
Aplts. at 3; citation to record omitted).

Their admission

acknowledges the correctness of the district court's conclusion:
Utah Code Section 63-30-15(2) requires that a civil
action must be filed within one year following the
10

denial of the claimant's notice of claim. Since the
Crismans did not file their civil action within one
year after the notice of claim was denied, they are
barred from bringing this action.
R. 350.
Instead of addressing this jurisdictional flaw, the Crismans
choose to ignore it and move directly to the merits of their
claim.

However, because of the absence of jurisdiction, the

district court did not reach the merits.

Its order as to the

Crismans' claim was based entirely on the bar erected by the
complaint's untimeliness (R. 350). The Crismans* admission of
the underlying facts leaves this Court without grounds for the
reversal they seek.
III. PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF IS INADEQUATE TO ATTACK THE DISTRICT
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT.
Even if the Court were to look beyond the dispositive
jurisdictional issues, plaintiffs' brief is inadequate to raise
an issue as to the district court's findings of fact.

It is

well-established that in challenging a court's findings of fact,
an appellant "may not simply reargue its position based on
selective excerpts of evidence presented to the trial court."
Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App.
1997).

Instead, the appellant "must marshal all the evidence

supporting the court's findings and then show that even viewing
the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the
decision, the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to
support those findings."

Kunz & Co. v. State, Dep't of Transp.,

949 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah App. 1997).
11

Indeed, "appellate counsel

must play the devil's advocate."

Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold

Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App.
1994).

As this court has stated, "[S]elective citation to the

record does not begin to marshal the evidence; it is nothing more
than an attempt to reargue the case before this court--a tactic
that we reject."

Id. at 1053.

Plaintiffs in this case argue that there is a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether Mr. Hallows was acting within
the scope of his employment.

Instead of marshaling the evidence,

they rely solely on the assertion contained in plaintiff Peters'
second affidavit, filed April 30, 1999, that Mr. Hallows
allegedly "admitted that they [sic] he had shot the dogs because
they had disturbed his garden and bothered his horses" (R. 342,
% 41)--an accusation that does not surface until fully 16 months
after the filing of the complaint, on the eve of the May 17, 1999
summary judgment hearing, and is not corroborated by any other
evidence of record.

It is significant that no mention of this

alleged admission is contained either in Peters' first affidavit,
dated some five-and-a-half months prior, nor in plaintiffs' 10page "Proffer of Oral Argument" submitted to the court on January
20, 1999 (R. 230-21) .4

In fact, Peters' late-breaking assertion

stands in direct contradiction to the allegations of the
complaint:

"Ted Hallows did not shoot the dogs in defense of any

livestock, domestic animals, household pets[,] persons or

4

The "Proffer of Oral Argument" has no evidentiary value but
is simply one attorney's interpretation of events.
12

personal property" (R. 9, 1 14). Since plaintiff Peters drafted
the complaint, his omission of such an inculpatory declaration
from the factual background of the case, as well as from his
first affidavit and the plaintiffs' proffer of argument, shows
the statement from his second affidavit to be no more than a
scintilla of evidence insufficient to preclude summary judgment
in Mr. Hallows' favor.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary
judgments.

It is substantively identical to Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In interpreting the state rule

where the federal analogue is substantively identical, the court
"'freely refer [s] to authorities which have interpreted the
federal rule."

Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah

App. 1992) (quoting Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick
Resources Corp., 805 P.2d 164, 168 (Utah 1990) (citations
omitted)).

Under the federal rule, it is firmly established that

"the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff's position will be insufficient . . ."to preclude
summary judgment.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

252 (1986).
Even taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Mr.
Hallows' alleged admission constitutes no more than an indication
of subjective intent.

Whatever his subjective motivation, Mr.

Hallows cannot be held liable for objective conduct that comports
with governing law.
Plaintiffs' claim that Mr. Hallowi "has told three different
13

stories of the shooting" (Brief of Aplts. at 14) gives no
citation to the record for the "story" that he shot the dogs for
disturbing his garden and horses.

An examination of the record

reveals the only support for this proposition to be the scintilla
of evidence in plaintiff Peters1 second affidavit, which does no
more than put uncorroborated words into Mr. Hallows' mouth.
Moreover, plaintiffs have failed to marshal the evidence
supporting the court's finding that "Hallows was acting within
the scope of his employment when he shot the dogs on April 24,
1996"

(R. 350). The record discloses that three persons in

addition to Mr. Hallows observed the dogs chasing protected
wildlife on the day of the shooting:

Gary Rice, a resident of

the area (R. 134-31); Tommy Thompson, another area resident
(R. 129-27); and Dana Dewey, a DWR employee (R. 125-22).

It is

uncontroverted that Mr. Hallows was on duty and in uniform on
April 24, 1996, when he followed up on a telephone call from Gary
Rice regarding wildlife being pursued by dogs (R. 303, HH 32-33).
Neither the Crismans (R. 139) nor Peters (R. 214, H 10) was
present when the dogs were shot; consequently, they have no
direct, personal knowledge of whether deer or elk were present at
that time.

John F. Kimball, Jr., DWR director, testified by

affidavit that
[t]he DRW is statutorily mandated to protect the
state's wildlife in trust for all citizens of the State
of Utah. The Utah Code § 23-14-1(2) (a) provides in
pertinent part: "....[t]he DWR shall protect,
propagate, manage, conserve, and distribute protected
wildlife throughout the state." Accordingly, the
mission statement ("mission") and policy of DWR is to
protect and help conserve and propagate all protected
14

wildlife and to take appropriate legal action to
achieve these goals.
R. 295, H 7.

He further testified that based on the affidavits

submitted in the case, he was able to conclude that Mr. Hallows
had acted within the parameters of his employment as a fish
hatchery employee when he shot the dogs (R. 291, UK 14-15;
R. 289-88, m

20 and 24-26; R. 286-85, 1 37).

Coloring the facts with pure conjecture yields plaintiffs no
better result.

In their statement of facts, for example,

plaintiffs relate that when Peters arrived home from work on the
day of the shooting, he checked the dog pen f s fences and found
them secured in a different manner than they allegedly had been
when he left that morning (Brief of Aplts. at 11). However,
there is no evidence tying any act of plaintiff to this asserted
condition.

While plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of

reasonable inferences from the evidence of record, they are not
entitled to the court's indulgence of idle speculation.

"Such

speculation falls short of creating a genuine issue of material
fact sufficient to survive summary judgment."

Gildea v. Guardian

Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1270 (Utah 1998).
Mr. Hallows' conduct, as evidenced by the facts of record,
is within both the scope of DWR policy and the protection of
statute, which the complaint explicitly acknowledges that Mr.
Hallows pointed out when plaintiff Peters initially confronted
him (R. 10, % 10). While the question of scope of employment is
ordinarily one of fact, "when the employee's activity is so
clearly within or outside the scope of employment that reasonable
15

minds cannot differ, the court may decide the issue as a matter
of law."

Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994).

Here, the evidence so clearly demonstrates that Mr. Hallows was
within the scope of his employment that the court correctly
determined the issue as a matter of law, and the scintilla of
evidence to the contrary fails to provide a. basis on which
reasonable minds could conclude otherwise.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs in this case neglected to follow the procedural
strictures of the governmental immunity act.
did not file a notice of claim at any time.

Plaintiff Peters
The Crismans

submitted a timely notice of claim, but failed to file their
complaint within one year of the claim's denial as required by
statute.

These defaults are, by themselves, sufficient grounds

for affirmance of summary judgment in Mr. Hallows' favor.

But

even if the merits in this case were reached, reasonable minds
could not differ in concluding that Mr. Hallows' actions were
taken within the scope of his employment.

For these reasons, as

more fully explained above, defendant, Ted Hallows, respectfully
requests the Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Defendant believes the law is sufficiently clear with
respect to the issues in this case that neither oral argument nor
published opinion is necessary.

If, however, the Court elects to
16

order oral argument, defendant wishes to participate
/
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/

NANCY1L. KEMP
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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